| Scientific Method
Scientific methods or processes are considered fundamental to the
scientific investigation and acquisition of new knowledge based
upon physical evidence. Scientists use observations, hypotheses
and deductions to propose explanations for natural phenomena in
the form of theories. Predictions from these theories are tested
by experiment. Any theory which is cogent enough to make predictions
can then be tested reproducibly in this way. The method is commonly
taken as the underlying logic of scientific practice. A scientific
method is essentially an extremely cautious means of building a
supportable, evidence-based understanding of our natural world.
History
The development of methods for scientific inquiry is indivisible
from the development of science. The Edwin Smith Papyrus (circa
1600 BC), an ancient surgical textbook, details the examination,
diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis of numerous ailments. [1] Although
the Ebers papyrus (ca 1550 BC) contains incantations and foul applications
created to cast out diseased demons and other superstition, there
is evidence of traditional empiricism.
In Ancient Greece, towards the middle of the 5th century BC, some
of the elements of a scientific tradition were already well established.
In Protagoras (318d-f), Plato mentions the teaching of arithmetic,
astronomy and geometry in schools. The philosophical ideas of this
time were mostly freed from the constraints of everyday phenomena
and common sense. This denial of reality as we experience it reaches
an extreme in Parmenides who argued that the world is one and that
change and subdivision do not exist.
Aristotle provided yet another of the ingredients of scientific
tradition: empiricism. For Aristotle, the Platonic, universal ideal
is to be found in particular things, what he calls the essence of
things. Using the concept of essence, Aristotle reconciles abstract
thought with observation. In Aristotelian science, we find the beginnings
of a primitive inductive method, although one that is based on collections
of objects rather than experimentation.
In his enunciation of a 'method' in the 13th century Roger Bacon,
under the tuition of Robert Grosseteste, was inspired by the writings
of Arab alchemists who had preserved and built upon Aristotle's
portrait of induction. Bacon described a repeating cycle of observation,
hypothesis, experimentation, and the need for independent verification.
In the 17th century, Francis Bacon attempted to describe a rational
procedure for establishing causation between phenomena. In the Novum
Organum (published 1620), Bacon is at pains to tell us that scientific
theories (or rather axioms) should remain as close to the facts
as possible:
"The understanding must not therefore be supplied with wings,
but rather hung with weights, to keep it from leaping and flying.
Now this has never been done; when it is done, we may entertain
better hopes of the sciences."
Bacon's method made progress "by successive steps not interrupted
or broken, we rise from particulars to lesser axioms; and then to
middle axioms, one above the other; and last of all to the most
general". The lesser axioms in this case should be rooted in
experience obtained under stringent experimental conditions, for
"experience, when it wanders in its own track, is [...] mere
groping in the dark". The middle axioms building on the lesser,
are "the true and solid and living axioms, on which depend
the affairs and fortunes of men". And, last of all, "those
which are indeed the most general" which are "abstract
and without solidity".
Bacon's aphorism nineteen (XIX, of Book One) criticizes the tendency
to leap to conclusions:
"There are and can be only two ways of searching into and
discovering truth. The one flies from the senses and particulars
to the most general axioms, and from these principles, the truth
of which it takes for settled and immovable, proceeds to judgment
and to the discovery of middle axioms. And this way is now in fashion."
and advocates a more cautious approach
"The other derives axioms from the senses and particulars,
rising by a gradual and unbroken ascent, so that it arrives at the
most general axioms last of all. This is the true way, but as yet
untried."
In 1619, René Descartes began writing his first major treatise
on proper scientific and philosophical thinking, the unfinished
Rules for the Direction of the Mind. With this document, Descartes
established the framework for a scientific method's guiding principles.
The following quote from his 1637 treatise, Discourse on Method
presents the four precepts that characterize a scientific method:
"The first was never to accept anything for true which I did
not clearly know to be such; that is to say, carefully to avoid
precipitancy and prejudice, and to comprise nothing more in my judgement
than what was presented to my mind so clearly and distinctly as
to exclude all ground of methodic doubt.
The second, to divide each of the difficulties under examination
into as many parts as possible, and as might be necessary for its
adequate solution.
The third, to conduct my thoughts in such order that, by commencing
with objects the simplest and easiest to know, I might ascend by
little and little, and, as it were, step by step, to the knowledge
of the more complex; assigning in thought a certain order even to
those objects which in their own nature do not stand in a relation
of antecedence and sequence.
And the last, in every case to make enumerations so complete, and
reviews so general, that I might be assured that nothing was omitted."
Both Bacon and Descartes wanted to provide a firm foundation for
scientific thought that avoided the deceptions of the mind and senses.
Bacon envisaged that foundation as essentially physical and factual,
whereas Descartes trusted to logic and mathematics.
Galileo Galilei combined quantitative experimentation and mathematical
analysis, to permit the enunciation of general physical laws. Isaac
Newton systematized these laws in the Principia, which became a
model that other sciences sought to emulate. His four "rules
of reasoning" are:
- We are to admit no more causes of natural things than such as
are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances.
- Therefore to the same natural effects we must, as far as possible,
assign the same causes.
- The qualities of bodies, which admit neither intension nor remission
of degrees, and which are found to belong to all bodies within
the reach of our experiments, are to be esteemed the universal
qualities of all bodies whatsoever.
- In experimental philosophy we are to look upon propositions
collected by general induction from phænomena as accurately
or very nearly true, notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses that
may be imagined, till such time as other phænomena occur,
by which they may either be made more accurate, or liable to exceptions.
But Newton also left an admonition about a theory of everything:
"To explain all nature is too difficult a task for any one
man or even for any one age. 'Tis much better to do a little with
certainty, and leave the rest for others that come after you, than
to explain all things."
Some methods of reasoning were systematized by John Stuart Mill's
Canons, which are five explicit statements of what can be discarded
and what can be kept while building a hypothesis. George Boole and
William Stanley Jevons also wrote on the principles of reasoning.
These attempts to systematize a scientific method were faced with
the Problem of induction, which points out that inductive reasoning
is not logically valid. David Hume set the difficulty out in detail.
Karl Popper, following others, argued that a hypothesis must be
falsifiable. Difficulties with this have led to the rejection of
the idea that there exists a single method that applies to all science,
and that serves to distinguish science from non-science.
In the past century, some statistical methods have been developed,
for reasoning in the face of uncertainty, as an outgrowth of statistical
hypothesis testing for eliminating error, an echo of the program
of Francis Bacon's Novum Organum.
The question of how science operates has importance well beyond
scientific circles or the academic community. In the judicial system
and in public policy controversies, for example, a study's deviation
from accepted scientific practice is grounds for rejecting it as
junk science or pseudoscience.
No recipe
The scientific method is not a recipe. It requires intelligence,
imagination, and creativity. Human imagination is a marvellous thing
that can span everything -- from what has happened to what could
happen. The scientific method merely places constraints on the imagination
by stating requirements for lines of reasoning, and then going on
from there.
Elements of a scientific method
The essential elements of a scientific method are iterations and
recursions of the following four steps:
- Characterization (Quantification, observation and measurement)
- Hypothesis (a theoretical, hypothetical explanation of the observations
and measurements)
- Prediction (logical deduction from the hypothesis)
- Experiment (test of all of the above)
The above includes observation in steps one and four. Each step
is subject to peer review for possible mistakes. These activities
do not describe all that scientists do (see below) but apply mostly
to experimental sciences (e.g., physics, chemistry). The steps above
are often taught in education1.
The Keystones of Science project, sponsored by the journal Science,
has selected a number of scientific articles from that journal and
annotated them, illustrating how different parts of each article
embody the science method. Here is one example, showing how a group
of scientists disproved a claim about lateral gene transfer in the
human genome.
DNA/example
Each step is illustrated by an example from the discovery of the
structure of DNA:
- DNA/characterization
- DNA/hypothesis
- DNA/prediction
- DNA/experiment
The examples are continued in "Evaluation and interation"
with DNA/iteration.
Characterization
A scientific method depends upon a careful characterization of
the subject of the investigation. (The subject can also be called
the problem or the unknown.) For example, Benjamin Franklin correctly
characterized St. Elmo's fire as electrical in nature, but it has
taken a long series of experiments and theory to establish this.
While seeking the pertinent properties of the subject, this careful
thought may also entail some definitions and observations; the observation
often demands careful measurement and/or counting.
The systematic, careful collection of measurements or counts of
relevant quantities is often the critical difference between pseudo-sciences,
such as alchemy, and a science, such as chemistry. Scientific measurements
taken are usually tabulated, graphed, or mapped, and statistical
manipulations, such as correlation and regression, performed on
them. The measurements might be made in a controlled setting, such
as a laboratory, or made on more or less inaccessible or unmanipulatable
objects such as stars or human populations. The measurements often
require specialized scientific instruments such as thermometers,
spectroscopes, or voltmeters, and the progress of a scientific field
is usually intimately tied to their invention and development.
Measurements demand the use of operational definitions of relevant
quantities. That is, a scientific quantity is described or defined
by how it is measured, as opposed to some more vague, inexact or
"idealized" definition. For example, electrical current,
measured in Amperes, may be operationally defined in terms of the
mass of silver deposited in a certain time on an electrode in an
electrochemical device that is described in some detail. The operational
definition of a thing often relies on comparisons with standards:
the operational definition of "mass" ultimately relies
on the use of an artifact, such as a certain kilogram of platinum
kept in a laboratory in France.
The scientific definition of a term sometimes differs substantially
from their natural language usage. For example, mass and weight
are often used interchangeably in common discourse, but have distinct
meanings in physics. Scientific quantities are often characterized
by their units of measure which can later be described in terms
of conventional physical units when communicating the work.
Measurements in scientific work are also usually accompanied by
estimates of their uncertainty. The uncertainty is often estimated
by making repeated measurements of the desired quantity. Uncertainties
may also be calculated by consideration of the uncertainties of
the individual underlying quantities that are used. Counts of things,
such as the number of people in a nation at a particular time, may
also have an uncertainty due to limitations of the method used.
Counts may only represent a sample of desired quantities, with an
uncertainty that depends upon the sampling method used and the number
of samples taken.
New theories sometimes arise upon realizing that certain terms
had not previously been sufficiently clearly defined. For example,
Albert Einstein's first paper on relativity begins by defining simultaneity
and the means for determining length. These ideas were skipped over
by Isaac Newton with, "I do not define time, space, place and
motion, as being well known to all." Einstein's paper then
demonstrates that they (viz., absolute time and length independent
of motion) were approximations. Francis Crick cautions us that when
characterizing a subject, however, it can be premature to define
something when it remains ill-understoodCri94. In Crick's study
of consciousness, he actually found it easier to study awareness
in the visual system, rather than to study Free Will, for example.
His cautionary example was the gene; the gene was much more poorly
understood before Watson and Crick's pioneering discovery of the
structure of DNA; it would have been counterproductive to spend
much time on the definition of the gene, before them.
The precession of Mercury
Precession of the perihelion (very exaggerated)The characterization
phase can require extended and extensive study, even centuries.
It took thousands of years of measurements, from the Chaldean, Indian,
Persian, Greek, Arabic and European astronomers, to record the precession
of the planet Earth. Newton was able to condense these measurements
into consequences of his laws of motion. But the perihelion of the
planet Mercury's orbit exhibits a precession which is not fully
explained by Newton's laws of motion. The observed difference for
Mercury's precession, between Newtonian theory and relativistic
theory (on the order of 42.5 arc-seconds per century), was one of
the pieces of evidence for Einstein's characterization of his theory
of General Relativity. This consequence (a difference in the values
for this precession of 42.5 arc-seconds per century) was known only
after the Schwarzschild solution to the Einstein field equation
was published in 1916.
DNA/characterization(1)
The history of the discovery of the structure of DNA is a classic
example of the four stages of the scientific method: in 1950 it
was known that genetic inheritance had a mathematical description,
starting with the studies of Gregor Mendel. But the mechanism of
the gene was unclear. Researchers in Bragg's laboratory at Cambridge
University made X-ray diffraction pictures of various molecules,
starting with crystals of salt, and proceeding to more complicated
substances. Using clues which were painstakingly assembled over
the course of decades, beginning with its chemical composition,
it was determined that it should be possible to characterize the
physical structure of DNA, and the X-ray images would be the vehicle.
Hypothesis development
A hypothesis is a suggested description of the subject.
Normally hypotheses have the form of a mathematical model. Sometimes,
but not always, they can also be formulated as existential statements,
stating that some particular instance of the phenomenon being studied
has some characteristic and causal explanations, which have the
general form of universal statements, stating that every instance
of the phenomenon has a particular characteristic.
Scientists are free to use whatever they can — their own
creativity, ideas from other fields, induction, systematic guessing,
Bayesian inference, etc. — to imagine possible explanations
for a phenomenon under study. The history of science is filled with
stories of scientists claiming a "flash of inspiration",
or a hunch, which then motivated them to look for evidence to support
or refute their idea. Michael Polanyi made such creativity the centrepiece
of his discussion of methodology.
In general scientists tend to look for theories that are "elegant"
or "beautiful". In contrast to the usual English use of
these terms, they here refer to a theory in accordance with the
known facts, which is nevertheless relatively simple and easy to
handle. If a model is mathematically too complicated, it is hard
to deduce any prediction
DNA/hypothesis(2)
For example, in the race to determine the structure of DNA, Francis
Crick and James Watson hypothesized that this molecule had a helical
structure: two intertwined spirals. But Linus Pauling was about
to embark on serious study of the molecule; he was hypothesizing
a triple helix.
Prediction from the hypothesis
Any useful hypothesis will enable predictions, by deductive reasoning.
It might predict the outcome of an experiment in a laboratory setting
or the observation of a phenomenon in nature. The prediction can
also be statistical and only talk about probabilities.
It is essential that the outcome be currently unknown. Only in
this case does the eventuation increase the probability that the
hypothesis be true. If the outcome is already known, it's called
a consequence and should have already been considered while formulating
the hypothesis.
If the predictions are not accessible by observation or experience,
the hypothesis is not yet useful for the method, and must wait for
others who might come afterward, and perhaps rekindle its line of
reasoning. For example, a new technology or theory might make the
necessary experiments feasible.
Halley's comet
The classic example was Edmund Halley's prediction of the year of
return of Halley's comet which returned after his death.
General Relativity
Einstein's prediction (1907): Light bends in a gravitational fieldEinstein's
theory of General Relativity makes several specific predictions
about the observable structure of space-time, such as a prediction
that light bends in a gravitational field and that the amount of
bending depends in a precise way on the strength of that gravitational
field. Arthur Eddington's observations made during a 1919 solar
eclipse supported General Relativity rather than Newtonian gravitation.
DNA/prediction(3)
When Watson and Crick hypothesized that DNA was a double helix,
Francis Crick predicted that a X-ray diffraction image of DNA would
show an X-shape.
Experiment
Once a prediction is made, it can be tested in an experiment. If
the test results contradict the prediction, then the hypothesis
under test is incorrect or incomplete and requires either revision
or abandonment. If the results confirm the prediction, then the
hypothesis is more likely to be correct but might still be wrong
and is subject to further testing.
Depending on the prediction the experiment can have different shapes.
It could be a classical experiment in a laboratory setting, a double-blind
study or an archeological excavation. Even taking a plane from New
York to Paris is an experiment which tests the aerodynamical hypotheses
used for constructing the plane.
Scientists assume an attitude of openness and accountability on
the part of those conducting an experiment. Detailed recordkeeping
is essential, to aid in recording and reporting on the experimental
results, and providing evidence of the effectiveness and integrity
of the procedure. They will also assist in reproducing the experimental
results. This tradition can be seen in the work of Hipparchus (190
BCE - 120 BCE), when determining a value for the precession of the
Earth over 2100 years ago, and 1000 years before Al-Batani.
DNA/experiment(4)
When James Watson was sent to investigate what Rosalind Franklin
had found in her X-ray diffraction images of DNA, he saw the X-shape
which Crick had predicted for a helical structure.
Evaluation and iteration
Testing and improvement
The scientific process is iterative. At any stage it is possible
that some consideration will lead the scientist to repeat an earlier
part of the process. Failure to develop an interesting hypothesis
may lead a scientist to re-define the subject they are considering.
Failure of a hypothesis to produce interesting and testable predictions
may lead to reconsideration of the hypothesis or of the definition
of the subject. Failure of the experiment to produce interesting
results may lead the scientist to reconsidering the experimental
method, the hypothesis or the definition of the subject.
Other scientists may start their own research and enter the process
at any stage. They might adopt the characterization and formulate
their own hypothesis, or they might adopt the hypothesis and deduce
their own predictions. Often the experiment is not done by the person
who made the prediction and the characterization is based on experiments
done by someone else. Published results of experiments can also
serve as a hypothesis predicting their own reproducibility.
Light
Light had long been supposed to be made of particles. Isaac Newton,
and before him many of the Classical Greeks, was convinced it was
so, but his light-is-particles account was overturned by evidence
in favor of a wave theory of light suggested most notably in the
early 1800s by Thomas Young, an English physician. Light as waves
neatly explained the observed diffraction and interference of light
when, to the contrary, the light-as-a-particle theory did not. The
wave interpretation of light was widely held to be unassailably
correct for most of the 19th century. Around the turn of the century,
however, observations were made that a wave theory of light could
not explain. This new set of observations could be accounted for
by Max Planck's quantum theory (including the photoelectric effect
and Brownian motion—both from Albert Einstein), but not by
a wave theory of light, nor by a particle theory.
DNA/iteration
Watson was able to deduce the essential structure of DNA by concrete
modelling of the physical shapes of the nucleotides which comprise
it. He was guided by the bond lengths which had been deduced by
Linus Pauling. In all of this, the nature of the chemical bond had
been characterized by the theory of quantum mechanics. After James
Watson and Francis Crick's breakthrough discovery, an entire field
of study was legitimized
Verification
Ball lightningScience is a social enterprise, and scientific work
will become accepted by the community only if they can be verified.
Crucially, experimental and theoretical results must be reproduced
by others within the science community. Researchers have given their
lives for this vision; Georg Wilhelm Richmann was killed by ball
lightning to his forehead (1753) when attempting to replicate the
1752 kite experiment of Benjamin Franklin.
Scope and goals
The scientific method can be applied to anything within the range
of our experiences. As long as something has an impact on our lives
we can formulate theories and try to predict, what this impact might
be. The impact itself is an experiment, testing whether our theory
was right. It can also be applied, starting with step four or step
three, to theories coming from different sources than the scientific
method itself, as long as those make prediction, or it is possible
to deduce some.
People use this method all the time. They have theories about devices
and make predictions how those will react to their actions. If a
device does not work as expected the experiment disproves their
theory. If they adjust their theory they are applying the scientific
method, if they nevertheless stick to their theory they don't.
The scientific method doesn't aim at giving an ultimate answer.
It's iterative and recursive nature implies, that it will never
come to an end. So any answer it gives is a provisional answer.
Hence it can't prove or verify anything in a strong sense. But if
a theory passed many experimental tests without being disproved,
it is considered superior to any theory, which has not yet been
put to a test.
Scientific community
Frequently the scientific method is not employed by a single person,
but by several people cooperating directly or indirectly. Such cooperation
can be regarded as one of the defining elements of a scientific
community. Various techniques have been developed to ensure the
integrity of the scientific method within such an environment.
Peer review evaluation
Scientific journals use a process of peer review, in which scientists'
manuscripts are submitted by editors of scientific journals to (usually
one to three) fellow (usually anonymous) scientists familiar with
the field for evaluation. The referees may or may not recommend
publication, publication with suggested modifications, or, sometimes,
publication in another journal. This serves to keep the scientific
literature free of unscientific or crackpot work, helps to cut down
on obvious errors, and generally otherwise improve the quality of
the scientific literature. Work announced in the popular press before
going through this process is generally frowned upon. Sometimes
peer review inhibits the circulation of unorthodox work, and at
other times may be too permissive. The peer review process is not
always successful, but has been very widely adopted by the scientific
community.
Reproduction and Recordkeeping
Sometimes experimentators may make systematic errors during their
experiments, or (in rare cases) deliberately falsify their results.
Consequently, it is a common practice for other scientists to attempt
to repeat the experiments in order to duplicate the results, thus
further validating the hypothesis.
As a result, experimentators are expected to maintain detailed
records of their experimental procedures, in order to provide evidence
of the effectiveness and integrity of the procedure and assist in
reproduction. These procedural records may also assist in the conception
of new experiments to test the hypothesis, and may prove useful
to engineers who might examine the potential practical applications
of a discovery.
Philosophical issues
Main article: philosophy of science
The study of a scientific method is distinct from the practice
of science and is more a part of the philosophy, history and sociology
of science than of science. While such studies have limited direct
impact on day-to-day scientific practice, they have a vital role
in justifying and defending the scientific approach.
We find ourselves in a world that is not directly understandable.
We find that we sometimes disagree with others as to the facts of
the things we see in the world around us, and we find that there
are things in the world that sometimes are at odds with our present
understanding. The scientific method attempts to provide a way in
which we can reach agreement and understanding. A perfect scientific
method would work in such a way that rational application of the
method would always result in agreement and understanding; in effect
a perfect method would not leave any room for rational agents to
disagree. Philosophers of science have long sought such a method.
The material presented below is intended to show that, as with all
philosophical topics, the search has been neither straightforward
nor simple.
Theory-dependence of observation
A scientific method depends on observation, in defining the subject
under investigation and in performing experiments.
Observation involves perception, and so is a cognitive process.
That is, one does not make an observation passively, but is actively
involved in distinguishing the thing being observed from surrounding
sensory data. Therefore, observations depend on some underlying
understanding of the way in which the world functions, and that
understanding may influence what is perceived, noticed, or deemed
worthy of consideration. (See the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis for an
early version of this understanding of the impact of cultural artifacts
on our perceptions of the world.)
Empirical observation is supposedly used to determine the acceptability
of some hypothesis within a theory. When someone claims to have
made an observation, it is reasonable to ask them to justify their
claim. Such a justification must make reference to the theory -
operational definitions and hypotheses - in which the observation
is embedded. That is, the observation is a component of the theory
that also contains the hypothesis it either verifies or falsifies.
But this means that the observation cannot serve as a neutral arbiter
between competing hypotheses. Observation could only do this "neutrally"
if it were independent of the theory.
Thomas Kuhn denied that it is ever possible to isolate the theory
being tested from the influence of the theory in which the observations
are grounded. He argued that observations always rely on a specific
paradigm, and that it is not possible to evaluate competing paradigms
independently. By "paradigm" he meant, essentially, a
logically consistent "portrait" of the world, one that
involves no logical contradictions. More than one such logically
consistent construct can each paint a usable likeness of the world,
but it is pointless to pit them against each other, theory against
theory. Neither is a standard by which the other can be judged.
Instead, the question is which "portrait" is judged by
some set of people to promise the most in terms of “puzzle
solving”.
For Kuhn, the choice of paradigm was sustained by, but not ultimately
determined by, logical processes. The individual's choice between
paradigms involves setting two or more “portraits" against
the world and deciding which likeness is most promising. In the
case of a general acceptance of one paradigm or another, Kuhn believed
that it represented the consensus of the community of scientists.
Acceptance or rejection of some paradigm is, he argued, more a social
than a logical process.
That observation is embedded in theory does not mean that observations
are irrelevant to science. Scientific understanding derives from
observation, but the acceptance of scientific statements is dependent
on the related theoretical background or paradigm as well as on
observation. Coherentism and scepticism offer alternatives to foundationalism
for dealing with the difficulty of grounding scientific theories
in something more than observations.
Indeterminacy of theory under empirical testing
The Quine-Duhem thesis points out that any theory can be made compatible
with any empirical observation by the addition of suitable ad hoc
hypotheses. This is analogous to the way in which an infinite number
of curves can be drawn through any set of data points on a graph.
This thesis was accepted by Karl Popper, leading him to reject
naïve falsification in favour of 'survival of the fittest',
or most falsifiable, of scientific theories. In Popper's view, any
hypothesis that does not make testable predictions is simply not
science. Such a hypothesis may be useful or valuable, but it cannot
be said to be science. Confirmation holism, developed by W. V. Quine,
states that empirical data is not sufficient to make a judgement
between theories. A theory can always be made to fit with the available
empirical data.
That empirical evidence does not serve to determine between alternate
theories does not imply that all theories are of equal value. Rather
than pretending to use a universally applicable methodological principle,
the scientist is making a personal choice when she chooses some
particular theory over another.
One result of this is that specialists in the philosophy of science
stress the requirement that observations made for the purposes of
science be restricted to intersubjective objects. That is, science
is restricted to those areas where there is general agreement on
the nature of the observations involved. It is comparatively easy
to agree on observations of physical phenomena, harder for them
to agree on observations of social or mental phenomena, and difficult
in the extreme to reach agreement on matters of theology or ethics.
Demarcation
Scientific Method is considered as one way of determining which
disciplines are scientific and which are not. Those which follow
a scientific method might be considered sciences; those that do
not are not. That is, method might be used as the criterion of demarcation
between science and non-science. If it is not possible to articulate
a definitive method, then it may also not be possible to articulate
a definitive distinction between science and non-science, between
science and pseudo-science, and between scientists and non-scientists.
Feyerabend denies there is a scientific method, and in his book
Against Method argues that scientific progress is not the result
of the application of any particular method. In essence, he says
that anything goes.
Science as a communal activity
In his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Kuhn argues
that the process of observation and evaluation take place within
a paradigm. 'A paradigm is what the members of a community of scientists
share, and, conversely, a scientific community consists of men who
share a paradigm' (postscript, part 1). On this account, science
can be done only as a part of a community, and is inherently a communal
activity.
For Kuhn the fundamental difference between science and other disciplines
is in the way in which the communities function. Others, especially
Feyerabend and some post-modernist thinkers, have argued that there
is insufficient difference between social practices in science and
other disciplines to maintain this distinction. It is apparent that
social factors play an important and direct role in scientific method,
but that they do not serve to differentiate science from other disciplines.
Furthermore, although on this account science is socially constructed,
it does not follow that reality is a social construct. Kuhn’s
ideas are equally applicable to both realist and anti-realist ontologies.
The definition of a scientific method is debatable and contended.
Positivist, empiricist, and falsificationist theories are unable
to satisfy their aim of giving a definitive account of the logic
of science. The sociology of science may be incapable of accounting
for the success of the scientific enterprise.
Scientific thought
Carl Sagan, in his book The Demon-Haunted World, argues that we
should use a scientific method as a tool for skeptical thinking.
When we are presented with a new concept — ESP, for example
— we should test the claims of its proponents against experiment
ourselves (or gather evidence from as many sources as possible),
and reject the theory if the evidence shows its claims to be false.
Sagan was particularly interested in those movements which misrepresent
science - pseudoscience or quackery.
Scientific method and the practice of science
The primary constraints on science are:
- Publication, i.e. Peer review
- Resources (mostly, funding)
It has not always been like this: in the old days of the "gentleman
scientist" funding (and to a lesser extent publication) were
far weaker constraints.
Both of these constraints indirectly bring in a scientific method
— work that too obviously violates the constraints will be
difficult to publish and difficult to get funded. Journals do not
require submitted papers to conform to anything more specific than
"good scientific practice" and this is mostly enforced
by peer review. Originality, importance and interest are more important
- see for example the author guidelines for Nature.
Criticisms (see Critical theory) of these restraints are that they
are so nebulous in definition (e.g. "good scientific practice")
and open to ideological, or even political, manipulation apart from
a rigorous practice of a scientific method, that they often serve
to censor rather than promote scientific discovery. Apparent censorship
through refusal to publish ideas unpopular with mainstream scientists
(unpopular because of ideological reasons and/or because they seem
to contradict long held scientific theories) has soured the popular
perception of scientists as being neutral or seekers of truth and
often denigrated popular perception of science as a whole.
Quotations
"The scientific approach to the examination of phenomena is
a defense against the pure emotion of fear." Tom Stoppard,
Rosencrantz & Guildenstern Are Dead (1967, page 17 in Grove
edition)
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