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Although behaviorism is commonly thought of as a psychological movement, most modern behaviorist's would agree that Behaviorism is a philosophy and upon which the science of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior is based. The basic premise of the behaviorist movement is that the study of behavior should be a natural science, such as chemistry or physics, without any reference to hypothetical inner states of organisms. Thus, behaviorism takes a functional view of behavior. Whether the science of the experimental analysis of behavior is rightly considered part of psychology, separate from psychology, or the only "true" psychology is still a topic debated by modern behaviorists. There are points of view within analytic philosophy that have called themselves, or have been called by others, behaviorist. In logical behaviorism (as held, e.g., by Rudolf Carnap and Carl Hempel), psychological statements meant their verification conditions, which consisted of performed overt behavior. W. V. Quine made use of a variety of behaviorism, influenced by some of Skinner's ideas, in his own work on language. Gilbert Ryle defended a distinct strain of philosophical behaviorism, sketched in his book The Concept of Mind. Ryle's central claim was that instances of dualism frequently represented 'category mistakes,' and hence that they were really misunderstandings of the use of ordinary language. It is sometimes argued that Ludwig Wittgenstein defended a behaviorist position, and there are important areas of overlap between his philosophy, logical behaviorism, and radical behaviorism (e.g., the beetle in a box argument). However, Wittgenstein was not a behaviorist, and his style of writing is sufficiently elliptical and allusive to admit of a range of interpretations. Equally contentious is an identification of Alan Turing as a behaviorist.
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